February 1998. Bill Gates, the richest man in the world, walks up the steps of a Brussels government building. He turns to wave at someone behind him, smiling as he faces forward again. Then it happens: a cream pie hits him square in the face. Then another. And another.
Just days earlier, Microsoft had invested $45 million in Belgian speech recognition company Lernout & Hauspie. The pie-throwing activist who orchestrated this pastry protest later described his feelings as “the exhilaration of victory, exquisite pleasure.” But the real mess Microsoft had just stepped into would prove far stickier than whipped cream.
In this episode of Oh My Fraud, host Caleb Newquist unravels one of tech history’s most fascinating fraud cases. It’s a story where revolutionary innovation and elaborate deception became so intertwined that even today, the technology you speak to through Siri carries the DNA of a spectacular Belgian scandal.
Two Guys, One Vision: Kill the Keyboard
In late 1987, two West Flanders natives started what seemed like an impossible mission: eliminating the computer keyboard. Jo Lernout, the visionary salesman, was a former teacher turned MBA who’d worked his way through sales positions at Merck and Wang Laboratories. Paul Hauspie was the detail-oriented worker type who’d inherited his father’s accounting firm but spent his spare time developing software.
Together, they founded Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products (L&H) in Ypres. While we take voice assistants for granted today, in the late 1980s, the idea that computers could be operated by voice alone was revolutionary.
The technology was groundbreaking. By 1997, their products could recognize more words than a standard collegiate dictionary. The system could even handle tricky sentences like “Please write a letter right now to Mrs. Wright. Tell her that two is too many to buy.” For the late 1990s, this was nothing short of miraculous.
But like many startups, the early years were brutal. Lernout and Hauspie proved resourceful in securing financing to keep the lights on, including from local residents and the Flanders government. But year after year, they plowed money into research and development while making virtually no revenue.
When Your Hometown Believes in You (Maybe Too Much)
The company’s roots ran deep into West Flanders soil. One account described it as “a company set up by West Flanders natives with West Flanders capital and a West Flanders mentality: work hard and smart, take well-calculated risks.”
Lernout and Hauspie genuinely wanted their success to benefit their home region. They helped create the Flanders Language Valley, convincing the government to make Ypres a tax haven for tech companies. Research grants flooded the area, spawning new businesses.
In 1994, when L&H needed more funding, they tapped into the locals with something called automatic convertible bonds. These were essentially IOUs that would turn into stock if the company ever went public. Through sheer personal will and persuasion, Lernout and Hauspie raised money from 600 small Flemish investors, each contributing an average of $33,000. These weren’t venture capitalists; they were farmers, grocers, and small traders betting their savings on their hometown heroes.
The duo even approached a local pig farmer for investment. After hearing their pitch, he produced a half-eaten bank savings certificate worth about $60,000 that he’d salvaged after it was accidentally fed to his pigs. The farmer said if the bank would accept the damaged certificate, he’d let them invest the funds. After much convincing, the bank took it.
The technology started attracting serious attention. AT&T invested $10 million in 1993. Intel put in $30 million. Then came Microsoft with $45 million in early 1998, with their chief technology officer declaring they were “taking a big leap forward in transforming that vision into a reality.”
The company went public on the Nasdaq in November 1995 at $12.50 per share, despite skepticism from analysts who worried the technology was still too primitive. But beneath this genuine innovation and community support, troubling signs were already emerging.
The Art of Moving Money in Circles
As L&H struggled to generate revenue, it constructed an increasingly complex web of related-party transactions to maintain the illusion of explosive growth.
The centerpiece was the Flanders Language Valley Fund (FLV), co-founded and advised by L&H’s founders. This venture fund took a 49% stake in the Belgian unit of Quarterdeck Corporation, which just happened to be L&H’s largest customer, accounting for 30% of its revenue.
The new CEO of Quarterdeck was Gaston Bastien, a Belgian executive infamous for rushing Apple’s Newton operating system to market to avoid losing a wine cellar bet. The result was faulty handwriting recognition that disappointed consumers. Now he was running L&H’s biggest customer, which was partially owned by a fund controlled by L&H’s founders.
L&H also created something called Dictation Consortium to keep expensive R&D costs off its books while somehow claiming $26.6 million in revenue from this entity in 1996 and 1997. Who owned 61% of Dictation Consortium? The FLV fund. The other investors, according to Lernout, were “five or six people who were anonymous because they were rolled up into companies that were organized in Luxembourg and the British Virgin Islands.”
Even Microsoft threw $3 million into the FLV fund alongside their $45 million L&H investment, apparently missing these red flags entirely.
The Asian Revenue Miracle That Wasn’t
The real magic happened in Asia. In 1999, Bastien (now L&H’s CEO) claimed Asian sales had exploded to more than $150 million versus just $10 million the year before. Korean revenue jumped from $97,000 to $58.9 million in a single quarter—a mind-boggling 60,000% increase. Singapore contributed $80.3 million in 1999 after generating less than $300,000 the previous year.
But here’s where it gets weird. Singapore sales then mysteriously plummeted to $501,000 in the first quarter of 2000. Bastien had perfectly reasonable explanations for everything, of course. The company had sold licenses in Singapore that couldn’t be sold again. Korea had opened up thanks to an acquisition. Everything was great.
When Wall Street Journal reporters investigated these miraculous Asian numbers in August 2000, they uncovered a house of cards. Some companies that L&H identified as Korean customers said they did no business with the company at all. Others said their purchases were much smaller than L&H claimed. Only one customer would go on record confirming the numbers were accurate.
One major customer, Hung-chang Lin, supposedly doing between $5 million and $10 million in business with L&H, had a CEO who didn’t even know about the joint venture that was allegedly purchasing the products. When confronted about the discrepancies, L&H’s contact at Hung-chang admitted they had lied about everything.
The scheme involved creating sales agreements that let “customers” defer paying licensing fees until they made money from L&H’s products. The company booked these as sales anyway, then made deals with banks where the banks would take over the receivables in exchange for cash. L&H claimed these were sales of receivables, but they were essentially disguised loans.
The $100 Million That Vanished
The drama reached its peak in November 2000 when new CEO John Duerden flew to Korea to retrieve $100 million the company desperately needed to avoid bankruptcy. After waiting an hour, Duerden was grilling the Korean unit head about the missing money when three men kicked open the door, shouting and gesticulating before dragging the unit head out of the room.
Duerden fled the country, later telling the Journal, “The only thing I know for certain is that the money is not in the bank accounts.”
The end came officially on November 9, 2000, when L&H announced it would restate its financial filings due to “errors and irregularities.” The company admitted its third-quarter revenue would be about $40 million less than reported. Lernout and Hauspie resigned as executive co-chairmen, though they kept 30% of the voting rights. Weeks later, the company filed for bankruptcy. The stock that had soared to $72.50 in March 2000 (a 2,500% increase from its IPO price) was worthless. Ten billion dollars in market value had evaporated.
Justice came slowly. In September 2010, a full decade after the collapse, Lernout, Hauspie, and Bastien were found guilty in Belgium. Lernout and Hauspie each received five-year sentences with two years suspended. In December 2021, a Belgian court awarded 4,000 shareholders €655 million—but as one news source noted, “the compensation ruling is largely symbolic as the six former board members don’t have the financial means with which to pay it.”
The Technology Lives On (Under New Management)
Lernout maintains to this day, “The technology was real and great.” And he’s not wrong.
After ScanSoft acquired L&H’s assets from bankruptcy in 2001, the speech recognition technology began a remarkable journey. ScanSoft merged with Nuance Communications in 2005. By 2013, Nuance’s natural language processing algorithms, which were built on L&H’s foundation, powered Apple’s Siri. In spring 2021, Microsoft acquired Nuance for $19.7 billion.
The same technology that L&H claimed would revolutionize computing actually did—just not under their ownership. The speech recognition in your phone and the voice assistant in your home all carry the DNA of a company that destroyed itself through fraud despite having a product that actually worked.
Lessons for the Number Crunchers
For accounting professionals, the L&H case offers a masterclass in red flags:
- Circular related-party transactions: When a company’s venture fund invests in its own customers, the revenue isn’t real
- Explosive geographic revenue shifts: A 60,000% increase should trigger every skeptical bone in an auditor’s body
- Anonymous investors in tax havens: Luxembourg and the British Virgin Islands aren’t known for transparency
- Revenue recognition without cash: Booking sales to customers who don’t have to pay isn’t revenue; it’s fiction
As Newquist emphasizes, “It isn’t enough just to have a great product or just great tech. If you cook the books, it doesn’t matter how good your product is. Bad numbers are bad numbers, and people get real upset about bad numbers.”
The L&H story proves that no amount of revolutionary technology can overcome the fundamental truth of financial reporting: when you cook the books, everyone gets burned except, ironically, the technology itself, which lives on in every voice command you give your phone today.
Listen to the full Oh My Fraud episode to hear Newquist’s complete investigation into this cautionary tale. CPAs can earn free NASBA-approved CPE credits through the Earmark app while learning these crucial fraud detection lessons. And remember, if you win a wine cellar on a bet, make that idiot pay up.
