Caleb Newquist

The Auditors, Lawyers, and Bankers Who Watched a Fraud Unfold and Kept Billing Hours

Earmark Team · February 17, 2026 ·

Two men stood at an LAX mailbox, passing an envelope between them like a hot potato.

“I don’t want to mail it. You mail it.”

Hours earlier, they’d flown from Chicago with no plan. Their mission was to intercept a confirmation letter before lawyers could verify lease terms with a customer. They’d arrived at the customer’s Los Angeles office just as a courier walked in ahead of them. While one man distracted the customer with lunch options, the other snuck into a nearby room, forged a signature, and faxed it back to the law firm.

Now they just had to mail the original back and catch their flight home. The envelope slipped from their hands and fell to the ground. They checked their watches—the flight was boarding. Without another word, they picked it up together and dropped it into the mailbox.

This scene captures exactly where OPM Leasing Services ended up. In a recent episode of Oh My Fraud, host Caleb Newquist traces how two childhood friends built one of America’s largest computer leasing companies, only to watch it collapse into a fraud worth more than $190 million.

Two Friends, One Dangerous Bet

Mordecai “Morty” Weissman and Myron Goodman went way back. Same Brooklyn yeshiva. Same college. By 1969, they were brothers-in-law when Myron married the sister of Morty’s wife. So when they started a business together in 1970 above a candy store in Brooklyn, it probably felt natural.

They called it OPM Leasing Services. The name supposedly stood for “Other People’s Machines.” But as Caleb points out, the interpretation that stuck was more cynical and ultimately more accurate: “Other People’s Money.”

In the early 1970s, if you were in the computer business at the enterprise level, there was one company that mattered: IBM. As Caleb puts it, “they were the only game in town.” These days, IBM is what he calls “the Norma Desmond of tech companies”—iconic but past its prime. Back then, they were creating the future.

OPM’s business model seemed straightforward. Borrow money to buy IBM mainframes. Lease them to corporations. Use the lease payments to service the loans and pocket the difference.

But Morty and Myron had a clever angle. While competitors wrote three- or four-year leases, OPM offered seven-year terms. The result was lower monthly payments that customers loved. As Caleb observes, “there’s never a shortage of price-conscious customers out there.”

The catch was that OPM required “hell or high water” clauses—lease payments had to be made no matter what. To sweeten the deal, customers could sublease computers back to OPM after three years, and OPM would re-lease them to someone else. If those payments didn’t cover the original amounts, OPM would eat the difference.

The entire model rested on one huge gamble: that IBM wouldn’t release better computers for seven years.

When Technology Refuses to Stand Still

Throughout most of the 1970s, the gamble seemed to pay off. OPM grew to 250 employees across 11 offices, including plush Manhattan headquarters. Their customer list read like a Who’s Who of American business: AT&T, Revlon, Polaroid, Merrill Lynch, Xerox, American Express, General Motors. Their biggest customer was the aerospace and defense giant Rockwell International.

Morty and Myron lived well. They settled into estates in Lawrence, Long Island. Myron decorated what the New York Times called his “baronial estate” with a disco and a small movie theater. He pledged $10 million to Yeshiva University and became its youngest trustee ever.

Competitors remained skeptical. Edward Czerny, president of the nation’s second-largest leasing company, said OPM was “going 180 degrees against what the industry was doing.” But as Caleb notes, skeptics don’t always get it right. People were skeptical of Amazon losing money for a decade. They thought automobiles would never replace horses.

Then came 1978.

IBM launched its Series 3000 computers, which were faster, smaller, and cheaper than anything on the market. Every big business wanted one, including OPM’s customers. As the New York Times reported, customers immediately started turning in their old computers. OPM had to accept “knock down rentals” for obsolete equipment, resulting in shortfalls of up to $40,000 per month on individual deals.

That same year, Morty and Myron purchased First National Bank of Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. Why would two computer leasing guys from New York buy a bank in Louisiana? As Caleb dryly notes, owning a bank might come in handy “for one reason or another, like for a check kiting scheme.”

The Desperate Descent

Check kiting exploits the “float,” or the days it takes checks to clear. You write checks between accounts with insufficient funds, timing deposits to create the appearance of money that doesn’t exist. Caleb calls it “the financial equivalent of the spinning plate routine.”

Those plates stayed airborne for six months before bank officials caught on. In March 1980, OPM pleaded guilty to 22 felonies and paid a $110,000 fine. “Virtually no one outside of Morty and Myron heard anything about it,” Caleb notes.

But the desperation only grew. Single computers became collateral for multiple loans at different banks, and they fabricated lease documents. In one example, OPM claimed monthly lease payments of $54,500 when the actual amount was $463. Documents described four IBM computers worth $3.1 million in Texas, when Rockwell’s records showed three pieces of equipment worth $20,000 in Los Angeles.

Judge Charles Haight Jr. later revealed the forgery technique. “Mr. Goodman would crouch under a glass table with a flashlight, and Mr. Weissman would trace the forged signatures.”

Warning signs accumulated. Business Week questioned OPM’s practices in 1978. Goldman Sachs resigned as their investment bank. But customers wanted to keep believing. When Edward Czerny showed the Business Week article to customers, he said, “most of them didn’t care.”

Everything unraveled in February 1981 when a routine inquiry discovered “rather poor forgeries” of a Rockwell executive’s signature. Within a month, lenders sued, alleging fraud exceeding $100 million. The final tally would reach $190 million from 19 lenders.

The Professionals Who Should Have Said No

The bankruptcy examiner’s report revealed a network of enablers who chose client relationships over professional responsibilities.

Lehman Brothers knew about the check kiting but never reported it. They continued representing OPM to lenders in “the best possible light,” downplaying concerns when convenient.

Fox and Company, the audit firm, “yielded to pressure to certify materially false and misleading financial statements.” In 1976, they initially drafted statements showing large losses. Myron Goodman told the audit partner to “get back to the grindstone and try to figure out a way to show a profit.” Because the firm was being paid by the guy yelling at them, that’s exactly what they did, using what the report called “questionable accounting techniques.”

Singer Hutner Levine and Seeman, OPM’s law firm, took the brunt of the blame. Partner Andrew Reinhard, Myron’s close friend, allegedly knew about the fraud as early as 1978. The report called him “a reluctant but knowing accomplice,” though he was never charged.

The story of John Clifton, OPM’s internal accountant, shows how badly the system failed. Clifton found evidence of bogus Rockwell leases, consulted a lawyer, turned the information over to Singer Hutner Levine & Seeman, and quit, hoping they’d handle it. His letter arrived while Myron Goodman happened to be at the firm’s offices making a “partial confession of unspecified past wrongdoing.” Goodman intercepted the letter, and the specifics stayed hidden.

Singer Hutner Levine & Seeman continued working for OPM, closing more than $70 million in fraudulent loans before finally resigning in September 1980. The bankruptcy report said they’d gotten “the worst possible advice about its ethical obligations.”

The Reckoning and the Lessons

OPM filed for bankruptcy in March 1981. By December, five executives had pleaded guilty to defrauding lenders. A year later, Morty and Myron pled guilty and received 10 and 12 years, respectively.

Judge Haight didn’t hold back. OPM was “basically insolvent” almost from the start and “survived by means of just fraud and bribery.” The frauds were “without parallel in the history of this court.”

Caleb draws several lessons from the wreckage:

Unorthodox business models deserve scrutiny. They’re not automatically fraudulent. After all, plenty of skeptics have been wrong. But when a company’s entire advantage rests on assumptions that defy common sense, like technology standing still for seven years, that’s worth examining.
Desperation breeds fraud. “Fraud is often a temporary solution to a problem,” Caleb observes. People convince themselves it’s just this once, they’ll pay it back, everything will be fine. “It’s almost never fine.”
“Too good to be true” still applies. OPM’s customers got deals nobody else could match. Even when Business Week raised questions, “most of them didn’t care.” People don’t want to stop believing they’re getting a great deal.
Professional enablers make large-scale fraud possible. Banks, auditors, and lawyers “didn’t say no to their client. They were conflicted in many ways and allowed things to go on for too long.”

And finally, Caleb calls the check kiting “the dumbest fraud on Earth.” There’s only one way it ends. Either you stop and face the consequences, or “money falls out of the sky.” The sky rarely cooperates.

For accounting professionals, the pressure to find creative solutions hasn’t changed since 1978. When clients pay your fees and threaten to fire you if they don’t like your answers, the temptation is real. The OPM case reminds us that professional independence is the only thing standing between aggressive accounting and criminal fraud.

“If your plan B is kiting checks, then plan A might need some work,” Caleb concludes:

Listen to the full episode for more details about this spectacular fraud, including the thorny attorney-client privilege issues that emerged from Singer Hutner Levine & Seeman’s conduct. It’s a story that proves some lessons in fraud never get old; they just get more expensive.

Three Fraud Schemes, Two Decades, and a Quarter-Billion Dollars in Stolen Money

Earmark Team · February 5, 2026 ·

On January 20, 2021, the last day of Donald Trump’s first presidential term, Eliyahu “Eli” Weinstein got a phone call that would rank among the best days of anyone’s life. The President of the United States had commuted his sentence, freeing him after eight years of a 24-year prison term for running a $200 million Ponzi scheme.

Six months later, he was already planning his next fraud.

In this episode of Oh My Fraud, host Caleb Newquist traces the jaw-dropping story of a fraudster who got a presidential second chance and immediately used it to steal another $44 million. It’s a tale that spans two decades, three separate fraud schemes, and over a quarter-billion dollars in losses.

The Community Leader Who Betrayed Everyone’s Trust

Eli wasn’t some shadowy figure operating from the margins. He was a pillar of the Orthodox Jewish community in Lakewood Township, New Jersey—home to Beth Medrash Govoha, the largest yeshiva outside of Israel. The son of a Jewish community leader and school principal from Brooklyn, Eli was known for his devout faith and generous donations to religious organizations. He spent millions on Judaica, Jewish devotional artwork and artifacts.

Starting around 2004, Eli began raising money for real estate deals. His pitch was simple: he had access to below-market properties, could flip them quickly to developers he had lined up, and everyone would make guaranteed returns with little risk. In the tight-knit Orthodox community, where deals often happen on handshakes with minimal paperwork, a respected leader’s word was his bond.

According to the 2011 federal indictment, just three investors—two in the UK and one in Bronxville, New York—put in over $136 million. The total losses exceeded $200 million.

The details in the indictment would be darkly funny if real people hadn’t lost everything. Eli raised $5.4 million for a project involving a national supermarket chain in Trotwood, Georgia. The only problems were there is no Trotwood, Georgia, and the supermarket chain had never heard of him.

Then there was the widow in Los Angeles who worked to help orphaned and poor children in Israel. Her dream was to open a music school for these kids. Eli convinced her to give him $1.2 million, promising to repay it in three weeks with interest. When she emailed asking him to “stop screwing around” and return her money, Eli’s response was two words: “f— you.”

He told a widow who helps orphans to go *$#%! herself.

But wait, it gets worse. When meeting with one victim’s representative, Eli asked what the representative’s wife and Eli had in common. When the man said he didn’t know, Eli replied, “We both f***ed you.”

The Judge Saw Right Through Him

At sentencing in February 2014, Judge Joel Pisano didn’t mince words. “You are a cheat. You lied and your deception is relentless. You’re consumed by deception.” He sentenced Eli to 22 years in prison, plus $250 million in restitution and $215 million in forfeiture.

But Eli couldn’t stop, even while awaiting trial. In February 2012, already under indictment, he started pitching investors on pre-IPO Facebook shares and Florida real estate he didn’t have. He used the money he raised to pay his lawyers for the fraud case.

That earned him an additional 24 months, bringing his total sentence to over 24 years. By white collar crime standards, it was harsh. But Eli had something most convicted fraudsters don’t: connections to people who could get his case in front of the President.

A Second Chance Immediately Squandered

The campaign for Eli’s clemency was well-organized. Criminal justice reform advocates argued his sentence was excessive. The White House statement noted that “numerous victims had written in support” and emphasized his seven children and loving marriage.

On Trump’s last day in office, he granted clemency to more than a dozen people facing fraud charges, which was a dramatic break from historical norms. As Caleb notes in the episode, white collar criminals were “very infrequently chosen for clemency” before Trump.

By July 2021, just six months after his release, Eli was building his next scheme. But his name and face had been everywhere. So he became “Mike Konig.”

The vehicle was Optimus Investments, Inc., supposedly dedicated to brokering deals on personal protective equipment (PPE) like masks, gloves, and hand sanitizer. This was mid-2021, when COVID supplies were still the hottest commodity on earth. “Mike Konig” claimed to have networks of government agencies, Turkish factory owners, and Israeli lawyers. He was always cagey about details. If everyone knew his contacts, he said, they could “reverse engineer him out of business.”

Richard Curry and Christopher Anderson started Tryon Management Group to raise money for these deals, eventually bringing in tens of millions. Investors received regular updates with videos of factories producing masks. “This is something that potentially has major legs,” Curry wrote enthusiastically.

Except almost none of it was real.

The Elaborate COVID Con Unravels

The deception was breathtaking. They hired temporary staff to pretend to be factory workers for videos. Someone in Vietnam procured just enough medical gear to fill a few kits for show. They purchased 5,000 empty boxes, wrapped them, and put them on pallets to represent orders.

The red flags were everywhere. A spreadsheet of Optimus’s expenses included a line reading “mystery expenses” next to $41,028,233.05. As Caleb observes, “A company dealing in medical supplies should not have mystery expenses. The only type of business that should have mystery expenses is whatever Scooby-Doo and the gang are always up to.”

Everything unraveled when Alaa Hattab, an Optimus associate, accidentally revealed the truth to Curry and Anderson. The baby formula deal was fake. The biggest mask deals were fake. The first aid kit deal was also fake.

Then came the bombshell: Mike Konig was actually Eli.

Curry and Anderson confronted him with hidden recording devices. On tape, Eli admitted, “I finagled and lied to people to cover us.” Then he asked them to keep his secret and help him continue. Incredibly, they agreed—at least temporarily.

By November 2022, with inflation surging and investors demanding their money, Tryon halted redemptions. When investors compared notes and found inconsistencies, one filed an SEC whistleblower report. The FBI arrested Eli at his home on July 18, 2023.

The Lessons for Accounting Professionals

After a seven-week trial, Eli was convicted in 2025 of securities fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy. In November 2025, he received a 37-year sentence. Over two decades, he had stolen more than a quarter-billion dollars.

Yitz Grossman, who had championed Eli’s clemency, told Bloomberg, “I still feel sick and embarrassed to speak with some of these people who gave me a letter to help out this family. My conclusion is he’s sick and he can’t control himself. He’s a deal junkie. He thinks he’s smarter than everybody else.”

This case is a reminder to accounting professionals and fraud examiners to look out for red flags appear over and over again, like:

Guaranteed returns with little risk
Short turnarounds that seem too good to be true
Minimal documentation or transparency
“Mystery expenses” in the tens of millions
Deals involving places that don’t exist

It also highlights how affinity fraud remains devastatingly effective because it weaponizes the trust that holds communities together. Eli’s victims trusted someone who demonstrated a commitment to their shared values.

On the political front, Obama’s administration created the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force in 2009 to prosecute financial crimes. Trump terminated it and replaced it with his own version. As Caleb observes with characteristic bluntness, Trump is “mercurial, petty, vindictive” and wouldn’t be above granting clemency to people Obama prosecuted simply because Obama prosecuted them.

The broader lesson is that when we reserve mercy for the wealthy and connected while ordinary offenders remain incarcerated, that’s not mercy at all. “That’s callous. That’s malevolent. And now maybe it’s American,” Caleb says.
Eli’s lawyer maintains his innocence and will appeal.

Listen to the full episode of Oh My Fraud to hear all the jaw-dropping details, damning quotes from court documents, and Caleb’s sharp commentary on what this case reveals about fraud, mercy, and American justice. Because when someone uses a presidential pardon to immediately start stealing again, we all need to pay attention.

Your Voice Assistant Works Today Thanks to Fraudsters Who Destroyed a $10 Billion Company

Earmark Team · January 28, 2026 ·

February 1998. Bill Gates, the richest man in the world, walks up the steps of a Brussels government building. He turns to wave at someone behind him, smiling as he faces forward again. Then it happens: a cream pie hits him square in the face. Then another. And another.

Just days earlier, Microsoft had invested $45 million in Belgian speech recognition company Lernout & Hauspie. The pie-throwing activist who orchestrated this pastry protest later described his feelings as “the exhilaration of victory, exquisite pleasure.” But the real mess Microsoft had just stepped into would prove far stickier than whipped cream.

In this episode of Oh My Fraud, host Caleb Newquist unravels one of tech history’s most fascinating fraud cases. It’s a story where revolutionary innovation and elaborate deception became so intertwined that even today, the technology you speak to through Siri carries the DNA of a spectacular Belgian scandal.

Two Guys, One Vision: Kill the Keyboard

In late 1987, two West Flanders natives started what seemed like an impossible mission: eliminating the computer keyboard. Jo Lernout, the visionary salesman, was a former teacher turned MBA who’d worked his way through sales positions at Merck and Wang Laboratories. Paul Hauspie was the detail-oriented worker type who’d inherited his father’s accounting firm but spent his spare time developing software.

Together, they founded Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products (L&H) in Ypres. While we take voice assistants for granted today, in the late 1980s, the idea that computers could be operated by voice alone was revolutionary.

The technology was groundbreaking. By 1997, their products could recognize more words than a standard collegiate dictionary. The system could even handle tricky sentences like “Please write a letter right now to Mrs. Wright. Tell her that two is too many to buy.” For the late 1990s, this was nothing short of miraculous.

But like many startups, the early years were brutal. Lernout and Hauspie proved resourceful in securing financing to keep the lights on, including from local residents and the Flanders government. But year after year, they plowed money into research and development while making virtually no revenue.

When Your Hometown Believes in You (Maybe Too Much)

The company’s roots ran deep into West Flanders soil. One account described it as “a company set up by West Flanders natives with West Flanders capital and a West Flanders mentality: work hard and smart, take well-calculated risks.”

Lernout and Hauspie genuinely wanted their success to benefit their home region. They helped create the Flanders Language Valley, convincing the government to make Ypres a tax haven for tech companies. Research grants flooded the area, spawning new businesses.

In 1994, when L&H needed more funding, they tapped into the locals with something called automatic convertible bonds. These were essentially IOUs that would turn into stock if the company ever went public. Through sheer personal will and persuasion, Lernout and Hauspie raised money from 600 small Flemish investors, each contributing an average of $33,000. These weren’t venture capitalists; they were farmers, grocers, and small traders betting their savings on their hometown heroes.

The duo even approached a local pig farmer for investment. After hearing their pitch, he produced a half-eaten bank savings certificate worth about $60,000 that he’d salvaged after it was accidentally fed to his pigs. The farmer said if the bank would accept the damaged certificate, he’d let them invest the funds. After much convincing, the bank took it.

The technology started attracting serious attention. AT&T invested $10 million in 1993. Intel put in $30 million. Then came Microsoft with $45 million in early 1998, with their chief technology officer declaring they were “taking a big leap forward in transforming that vision into a reality.”

The company went public on the Nasdaq in November 1995 at $12.50 per share, despite skepticism from analysts who worried the technology was still too primitive. But beneath this genuine innovation and community support, troubling signs were already emerging.

The Art of Moving Money in Circles

As L&H struggled to generate revenue, it constructed an increasingly complex web of related-party transactions to maintain the illusion of explosive growth.

The centerpiece was the Flanders Language Valley Fund (FLV), co-founded and advised by L&H’s founders. This venture fund took a 49% stake in the Belgian unit of Quarterdeck Corporation, which just happened to be L&H’s largest customer, accounting for 30% of its revenue.

The new CEO of Quarterdeck was Gaston Bastien, a Belgian executive infamous for rushing Apple’s Newton operating system to market to avoid losing a wine cellar bet. The result was faulty handwriting recognition that disappointed consumers. Now he was running L&H’s biggest customer, which was partially owned by a fund controlled by L&H’s founders.

L&H also created something called Dictation Consortium to keep expensive R&D costs off its books while somehow claiming $26.6 million in revenue from this entity in 1996 and 1997. Who owned 61% of Dictation Consortium? The FLV fund. The other investors, according to Lernout, were “five or six people who were anonymous because they were rolled up into companies that were organized in Luxembourg and the British Virgin Islands.”

Even Microsoft threw $3 million into the FLV fund alongside their $45 million L&H investment, apparently missing these red flags entirely.

The Asian Revenue Miracle That Wasn’t

The real magic happened in Asia. In 1999, Bastien (now L&H’s CEO) claimed Asian sales had exploded to more than $150 million versus just $10 million the year before. Korean revenue jumped from $97,000 to $58.9 million in a single quarter—a mind-boggling 60,000% increase. Singapore contributed $80.3 million in 1999 after generating less than $300,000 the previous year.

But here’s where it gets weird. Singapore sales then mysteriously plummeted to $501,000 in the first quarter of 2000. Bastien had perfectly reasonable explanations for everything, of course. The company had sold licenses in Singapore that couldn’t be sold again. Korea had opened up thanks to an acquisition. Everything was great.

When Wall Street Journal reporters investigated these miraculous Asian numbers in August 2000, they uncovered a house of cards. Some companies that L&H identified as Korean customers said they did no business with the company at all. Others said their purchases were much smaller than L&H claimed. Only one customer would go on record confirming the numbers were accurate.

One major customer, Hung-chang Lin, supposedly doing between $5 million and $10 million in business with L&H, had a CEO who didn’t even know about the joint venture that was allegedly purchasing the products. When confronted about the discrepancies, L&H’s contact at Hung-chang admitted they had lied about everything.

The scheme involved creating sales agreements that let “customers” defer paying licensing fees until they made money from L&H’s products. The company booked these as sales anyway, then made deals with banks where the banks would take over the receivables in exchange for cash. L&H claimed these were sales of receivables, but they were essentially disguised loans.

The $100 Million That Vanished

The drama reached its peak in November 2000 when new CEO John Duerden flew to Korea to retrieve $100 million the company desperately needed to avoid bankruptcy. After waiting an hour, Duerden was grilling the Korean unit head about the missing money when three men kicked open the door, shouting and gesticulating before dragging the unit head out of the room.

Duerden fled the country, later telling the Journal, “The only thing I know for certain is that the money is not in the bank accounts.”

The end came officially on November 9, 2000, when L&H announced it would restate its financial filings due to “errors and irregularities.” The company admitted its third-quarter revenue would be about $40 million less than reported. Lernout and Hauspie resigned as executive co-chairmen, though they kept 30% of the voting rights. Weeks later, the company filed for bankruptcy. The stock that had soared to $72.50 in March 2000 (a 2,500% increase from its IPO price) was worthless. Ten billion dollars in market value had evaporated.

Justice came slowly. In September 2010, a full decade after the collapse, Lernout, Hauspie, and Bastien were found guilty in Belgium. Lernout and Hauspie each received five-year sentences with two years suspended. In December 2021, a Belgian court awarded 4,000 shareholders €655 million—but as one news source noted, “the compensation ruling is largely symbolic as the six former board members don’t have the financial means with which to pay it.”

The Technology Lives On (Under New Management)

Lernout maintains to this day, “The technology was real and great.” And he’s not wrong.

After ScanSoft acquired L&H’s assets from bankruptcy in 2001, the speech recognition technology began a remarkable journey. ScanSoft merged with Nuance Communications in 2005. By 2013, Nuance’s natural language processing algorithms, which were built on L&H’s foundation, powered Apple’s Siri. In spring 2021, Microsoft acquired Nuance for $19.7 billion.

The same technology that L&H claimed would revolutionize computing actually did—just not under their ownership. The speech recognition in your phone and the voice assistant in your home all carry the DNA of a company that destroyed itself through fraud despite having a product that actually worked.

Lessons for the Number Crunchers

For accounting professionals, the L&H case offers a masterclass in red flags:

Circular related-party transactions: When a company’s venture fund invests in its own customers, the revenue isn’t real
Explosive geographic revenue shifts: A 60,000% increase should trigger every skeptical bone in an auditor’s body
Anonymous investors in tax havens: Luxembourg and the British Virgin Islands aren’t known for transparency
Revenue recognition without cash: Booking sales to customers who don’t have to pay isn’t revenue; it’s fiction

As Newquist emphasizes, “It isn’t enough just to have a great product or just great tech. If you cook the books, it doesn’t matter how good your product is. Bad numbers are bad numbers, and people get real upset about bad numbers.”

The L&H story proves that no amount of revolutionary technology can overcome the fundamental truth of financial reporting: when you cook the books, everyone gets burned except, ironically, the technology itself, which lives on in every voice command you give your phone today.

Listen to the full Oh My Fraud episode to hear Newquist’s complete investigation into this cautionary tale. CPAs can earn free NASBA-approved CPE credits through the Earmark app while learning these crucial fraud detection lessons. And remember, if you win a wine cellar on a bet, make that idiot pay up.

When 37,000 Japanese Investors Discovered Their Dividends Were Now “Divine”

Earmark Team · January 24, 2026 ·

Picture opening your quarterly dividend envelope in February 2007, expecting yen, one of the world’s most stable currencies, but instead finding paper vouchers denominated in “Enten,” which literally means “divine money” in Japanese. These heavenly tokens were only good in one man’s bizarre marketplace where you could buy bedding, socks, and produce, but definitely couldn’t pay your rent.

This actually happened to 37,000 Japanese investors who discovered their life savings had been converted into monopoly money.

In the latest Oh My Fraud episode, “Divine Yen, Devilish Fraud,” host Caleb Newquist unpacks one of Japan’s most absurd financial frauds. The story of Kazutsugi Nami and his Ladies & Gentleman company—yes, that was the actual name—offers critical lessons for accounting professionals in a time of growing cryptocurrency schemes.

A Career Built on Fraud

You might think a fraud conviction would end someone’s career in finance. Kazutsugi proved otherwise, repeatedly.

His criminal timeline reads like a fraudster’s greatest hits. In the 1970s, as vice president of APO Japan, he helped market fake exhaust gas removers through a pyramid scheme. The devices didn’t work, but 250,000 people bought in before the company went bankrupt and authorities came knocking.

Most people would have learned their lesson. Not Kazutsugi.

By 1973, he’d already founded Nozakku Co., selling “magic stones” that supposedly purified tap water. The timing was perfect, as Japan faced severe water contamination from rapid industrialization, and desperate people wanted solutions. At its peak, Nozakku pulled in roughly ¥2 billion annually (about $6-8 million in late 1970s dollars). The stones weren’t magic. They didn’t purify anything. By 1978, Kazutsugi was in prison for fraud.

In a move that should make every accounting professional pause, in 1987, while his fraud record was still fresh, Kazutsugi founded Ladies & Gentleman (L&G). Eventually, 37,000 investors would hand over billions of yen to a convicted fraudster. One victim later justified their investment because L&G had been “in business for a long time.”

The bizarre culmination came on February 4, 2009, when police arrived to arrest him. Instead of hiding, Kazutsugi held court at a restaurant, charging reporters ¥10,000 each to attend his breakfast press conference while he sipped beer at 5:30 AM. He’d even packed spare underwear, expecting the arrest.

When asked about defrauding investors, his response was pure theater. “Do you think I could behave openly like this if there had been a fraud?” Later, he added, “Time will tell if I’m a con man or a swindler.”

The Divine Currency Revolution That Wasn’t

Kazutsugi didn’t just promise returns; he promised revolution. He called Enten the future of money, a currency that would break free from Japan’s economic system. He claimed governments would eventually adopt it and that he had a divine decree to eliminate poverty worldwide.

At investor events that resembled religious revivals, Kazutsugi styled himself as a modern-day Oda Nobunaga, one of Japan’s great historical figures, who unified Japan through military conquest in the 16th century.

The 36% annual returns Kazutsugi promised should have been an immediate red flag. In 2007, when Japanese government bonds yielded around 1.5%, 36% guaranteed returns defied financial gravity. Yet thousands of investors, many elderly and seeking retirement security, handed over their savings.

The scheme’s genius was its gradual escalation. Initially, L&G paid dividends in real yen, establishing trust. Then in early 2007, dividends became partially Enten. Finally, they were paid entirely in this imaginary currency that could only be spent in L&G’s internal marketplace, essentially a curated flea market offering comforters, vitamins, and produce.

As Caleb observes in the episode, these are exactly the products “multi-level marketing companies love because you can just claim it’s enhanced by whatever mystical bullshit you are selling that year.”

When Vision Meets Delusion

During the episode, Caleb and producer Zach Frank explore fascinating parallels between cult leaders and modern tech CEOs. Both sell transcendent visions that attract devoted followers.

“They see themselves as right. They’re cocky, they know the way, and they’re the only ones who know the way,” Zach observes.

This absolute certainty becomes magnetic. Caleb notes how Elon Musk, before his political involvement exposed his character. “He had this vision for the world. We’re going to Mars and we’re going to save the world. And people are like, yeah, I’ll follow you anywhere.”

Zach offers crucial insight about why these figures gain traction. “We’re in a time where gurus are becoming more popular than ever. It has to do with the lack of trust in institutions and science in general. People want to find someone to give them the answers to everything.”

When traditional systems seem to be failing, like during the 2007-2008 financial crisis when L&G was collapsing, the person who claims to have all the answers becomes irresistibly attractive.

The Spectacular Collapse

When L&G announced dividends would only be paid in Enten—no more real yen—investors understandably panicked. Some wanted to know whether they could exchange Enten for things like rent and food. They could not.

Like a classic bank run, investors crowded outside L&G locations demanding money and answers. The Japanese press pounced on the story. In November 2007, L&G filed for bankruptcy with estimated losses between ¥126 billion to ¥226 billion (roughly $1-2 billion USD). It was rumored to be Japan’s largest consumer investment fraud ever.

Even as police led him away, Kazutsugi insisted, “I am the poorest victim. Nobody lost more than I did.”

In March 2010, Kazutsugi was sentenced to 18 years in prison, a harsh sentence by Japanese standards. Even then, he insisted Enten was the future.

Lessons for the Profession

For accounting professionals, these patterns translate into specific warning signs:

Gradual shifts in payment methods that move from standard to non-standard practices
Closed ecosystems where value can only be realized within the company’s control
Recruitment-based growth models dressed up as community building
Attacks on regulators rather than substantive responses to concerns
Appeals to revolution that discourage traditional due diligence
Impossible guaranteed returns justified by proprietary methods

Distinguishing between legitimate innovation and sophisticated fraud requires more than technical knowledge; it requires understanding the psychology of persuasion.

Real innovations might disrupt industries, but they don’t violate mathematical laws. A 36% guaranteed return isn’t innovation; it’s impossibility. A currency that only works in one company’s marketplace is company scrip, a practice outlawed in most developed nations for good reason.

As Caleb warns, “If someone promises you a 36% annual return, but that return comes back to you in tokens that are only good for bedsheets, fruits, and the occasional pressure cooker, you are not diversifying your portfolio. You are subsidizing a cult with slightly better stationery.”

Listen to the full Oh My Fraud episode to hear the complete breakdown of this bizarre case, including more details about the victims and the reasons smart people fall for obvious frauds. The episode offers insights that connect historical frauds to modern schemes and the psychological vulnerabilities that transcend cultures and currencies.

Whether it’s cryptocurrency, NFTs, or the next financial revolution, the pattern persists: charismatic leaders promising transformation, impossible returns dressed as innovation, and schemes that create confusion where clarity is desperately needed. Our role as accounting professionals is to ensure that when someone claims to be building the future, they’re working with real materials, not divine intervention.

Ancient Fraudsters Wrote the Playbook Modern White-Collar Criminals Still Follow

Earmark Team · January 17, 2026 ·

Picture a man frantically sawing through the bottom of his own ship in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea. Passengers rush below deck to find him red-handed, hole half-cut, wood shavings floating in the rising water. A chase ensues. The would-be fraudster, cornered and desperate, hurls himself into the ocean rather than face justice.

This isn’t a Netflix true crime series; it’s a 2,300-year-old insurance fraud that went spectacularly wrong.

In the latest episode of Oh My Fraud, host Caleb Newquist takes listeners on a journey through time to explore some of history’s earliest recorded financial frauds. Fresh from his European travels (with a particular fondness for Budapest’s goulash and Vienna’s coffeehouse culture), Caleb digs into ancient schemes that prove creative accounting isn’t a modern invention.

When Rome Literally Auctioned Off the Throne

The Year of Five Emperors in 193 reads like a corporate governance nightmare. It started with Emperor Commodus getting assassinated on New Year’s Eve 192 and creating what Caleb calls “quite an exciting start to the year 193.”

His successor, Pertinax, took the throne with big plans to reform Rome’s finances, which Commodus had left in ruins. Think of him as the turnaround CEO brought in after a spending spree. His first move was cutting the donativum, the cash gifts emperors traditionally paid to the Praetorian Guard when taking power.

Bad idea. The Praetorian Guard, Rome’s elite military unit responsible for protecting the emperor, didn’t appreciate their bonus getting slashed. When Pertinax’s follow-up offers still fell short, around 300 guards stormed the palace. After what Caleb imagines as “a very brief conversation,” they assassinated him. His entire reign: 87 days.

What happened next defies belief. The Praetorian Guard auctioned off the throne to the highest bidder. Marcus Didius Julianus won and became emperor, essentially purchasing the Roman Empire like buying a company at auction. But word quickly spread about how he got the throne. Three influential generals rebelled and claimed it for themselves. Within 66 days, Julianus was assassinated, ending one of the shortest reigns in Roman history.

The parallels to modern corporate fraud are hard to miss. We’ve seen executives obtain positions through financial manipulation and insider dealing. The donativum system itself mirrors modern bonus structures that create dangerous dependencies. When those bonuses get cut, whether in ancient Rome or on Wall Street, the backlash can destroy companies and careers.

The World’s First Insurance Fraud Goes Sideways

If the Roman story shows political corruption at its worst, ancient Greece produced the world’s first recorded insurance scam in 360 BCE. Meet Hegestratos, a sea merchant with a plan that was elegant in its simplicity and spectacular in its failure.

To understand the scheme, you need to understand bottomry loans. Back then, sea travel was genuinely terrifying. Ships sank all the time. Bottomry allowed merchants to borrow money using their ship and cargo as collateral. If the vessel reached its destination, the merchant sold the cargo, repaid the loan with interest, and kept the profit. If the ship sank, the lender ate the loss. It was proto-insurance built on trust that merchants wouldn’t deliberately sink their own vessels.

Hegestratos saw opportunity where others saw protection. He and his coconspirator Zenothemis took out a bottomry loan for a grain shipment from Syracuse to Athens. But instead of using the money properly, they immediately sent it to Massalia (modern-day Marseille). They planned to sail for a few days, scuttle the ship, claim tragic loss at sea, and keep both the loan money and the grain.

Two or three days into the voyage, Hegestratos decided it was showtime. He snuck below deck and began cutting a hole in the ship’s hull. Meanwhile, Zenothemis stayed topside, supposedly creating a diversion.

But as Caleb hilariously reimagines it, Zenothemis was terrible at his job. Picture him “fake coughing every time there’s a loud noise from down below” while other passengers, who already didn’t like him, grew suspicious. The cutting was loud. The diversion was pathetic. Soon, passengers rushed below to find Hegestratos literally caught red-handed.

What followed was pure slapstick. Caleb envisions it as “one of those Keystone Cops chase scenes with Yakety Sax playing behind it.” Hegestratos flees through the ship, passengers in hot pursuit, ending with the fraudster hurling himself into the Mediterranean. As the ancient orator Demosthenes recorded, “Thus miserable as he was, he met a miserable end as he deserved, suffering the fate which he proposed to bring about for others.”

You’d think watching your partner drown would inspire some soul-searching. Not Zenothemis. With remarkable audacity, he tried to continue the fraud. He actually asked the crew to sink the ship anyway, arguing that “all hope was lost.”

When that failed and they limped to shore at Cephallenia, there was a dispute. Protus, the “supercargo” responsible for the grain reaching Athens, wanted to continue there. Zenothemis insisted they go to Massalia, claiming connections to the deceased fraudster and the original lenders. The local magistrates sided with Protus. They ordered the ship to Athens, where Zenothemis filed lawsuits claiming ownership of the grain.

The Mystery Ending That Still Bugs Historians

The frustrating part of this story is we don’t know how it ended. The original documents were “mutilated,” leaving only 32 paragraphs that “yielded no satisfactory sense” about the final verdict.

This uncertainty has sparked debate for centuries. John M. Zane’s 1925 Michigan Law Review analysis offers a twist: maybe Zenothemis wasn’t a coconspirator but another victim. Zane points out that Zenothemis had no access to the redirected money, no legitimate claim to sell the cargo, and nothing to gain from the ship sinking. Maybe he desired to return to Massalia because he genuinely wanted to collect insurance to repay his lender friends.

Zane even suggests that if it went to trial, the rich lenders probably lost because Athenian juries were populist and unsympathetic to wealthy plaintiffs, a dynamic that sounds familiar to anyone following modern white-collar crime prosecutions.

Whether Zenothemis was a fraudster or a fool, the case establishes a principle fundamental to financial law: fraudulent contracts are void. This ancient precedent echoes through centuries of case law and continues protecting victims today.

Ancient Schemes, Modern Lessons

As Caleb notes, there are no new frauds, just new fraudsters. The schemes evolved from bottomry loans to blockchain, from cutting holes in ships to cutting corners in compliance, but the patterns remain:

Exploiting trust. Bottomry loans worked because people trusted merchants wouldn’t sink their own ships, just as modern systems assume executives won’t tank their own companies
The coconspirator problem. Hegestratos learned fatally that complex fraud needs help, yet every additional conspirator multiplies detection risk
Documentation dilemmas. Even in 360 BCE, fraudsters needed false paperwork and had to manage competing claims
Greed override. Both cases show how easy money overrides rational risk assessment

Caleb’s observation about creating diversions particularly resonates: “You cannot have any weak links in your conspiracy. Don’t think you can just let some hack create a half-assed diversion for you.” His reimagining of Zenothemis’s pathetic distraction attempts—fake coughing to cover ship-cutting sounds—reminds us that fraud often fails not in conception but in execution.

For CPAs and fraud examiners, these aren’t just historical curiosities; they’re training exercises in pattern recognition. The executive inflating revenues for bonuses follows Julianus’s playbook. The insurance fraudster staging accidents mirrors Hegestratos’s scheme. Understanding these patterns helps professionals spot red flags before they become scandals.

The Timeless Blueprint of Financial Deception

From emperors buying their positions to merchants attempting insurance fraud, these ancient cases reveal that financial deception is as old as commerce itself. The schemes involved ships instead of spreadsheets, cargo instead of cryptocurrency, but the underlying patterns of exploiting trust, creating false documentation, and letting greed override judgment haven’t changed.

For today’s accounting professionals, these historical frauds serve as cautionary tales and educational tools. That executive oddly eager to bypass controls? They’re following Julianus’s playbook. That unusual insurance claim with convenient timing? It echoes Hegestratos’s bottomry loan scheme. The vendor insisting on redirecting payments? They’re pulling a move as old as Massalia.

What makes these ancient frauds valuable is their stripped-down simplicity. Without modern financial instruments and digital smokescreens, we see the raw mechanics of deception. The Praetorian Guard’s throne auction isn’t fundamentally different from a board being bought off; it’s just more honest about the transaction.

Listen to the full episode of Oh My Fraud to hear Caleb bring these ancient frauds to life with his signature blend of historical detail and irreverent humor. Because sometimes the best way to understand today’s financial crimes is to study the fraudsters who wrote the original playbook over two millennia ago.