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Accounting Fraud

Ancient Fraudsters Wrote the Playbook Modern White-Collar Criminals Still Follow

Earmark Team · January 17, 2026 ·

Picture a man frantically sawing through the bottom of his own ship in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea. Passengers rush below deck to find him red-handed, hole half-cut, wood shavings floating in the rising water. A chase ensues. The would-be fraudster, cornered and desperate, hurls himself into the ocean rather than face justice.

This isn’t a Netflix true crime series; it’s a 2,300-year-old insurance fraud that went spectacularly wrong.

In the latest episode of Oh My Fraud, host Caleb Newquist takes listeners on a journey through time to explore some of history’s earliest recorded financial frauds. Fresh from his European travels (with a particular fondness for Budapest’s goulash and Vienna’s coffeehouse culture), Caleb digs into ancient schemes that prove creative accounting isn’t a modern invention.

When Rome Literally Auctioned Off the Throne

The Year of Five Emperors in 193 reads like a corporate governance nightmare. It started with Emperor Commodus getting assassinated on New Year’s Eve 192 and creating what Caleb calls “quite an exciting start to the year 193.”

His successor, Pertinax, took the throne with big plans to reform Rome’s finances, which Commodus had left in ruins. Think of him as the turnaround CEO brought in after a spending spree. His first move was cutting the donativum, the cash gifts emperors traditionally paid to the Praetorian Guard when taking power.

Bad idea. The Praetorian Guard, Rome’s elite military unit responsible for protecting the emperor, didn’t appreciate their bonus getting slashed. When Pertinax’s follow-up offers still fell short, around 300 guards stormed the palace. After what Caleb imagines as “a very brief conversation,” they assassinated him. His entire reign: 87 days.

What happened next defies belief. The Praetorian Guard auctioned off the throne to the highest bidder. Marcus Didius Julianus won and became emperor, essentially purchasing the Roman Empire like buying a company at auction. But word quickly spread about how he got the throne. Three influential generals rebelled and claimed it for themselves. Within 66 days, Julianus was assassinated, ending one of the shortest reigns in Roman history.

The parallels to modern corporate fraud are hard to miss. We’ve seen executives obtain positions through financial manipulation and insider dealing. The donativum system itself mirrors modern bonus structures that create dangerous dependencies. When those bonuses get cut, whether in ancient Rome or on Wall Street, the backlash can destroy companies and careers.

The World’s First Insurance Fraud Goes Sideways

If the Roman story shows political corruption at its worst, ancient Greece produced the world’s first recorded insurance scam in 360 BCE. Meet Hegestratos, a sea merchant with a plan that was elegant in its simplicity and spectacular in its failure.

To understand the scheme, you need to understand bottomry loans. Back then, sea travel was genuinely terrifying. Ships sank all the time. Bottomry allowed merchants to borrow money using their ship and cargo as collateral. If the vessel reached its destination, the merchant sold the cargo, repaid the loan with interest, and kept the profit. If the ship sank, the lender ate the loss. It was proto-insurance built on trust that merchants wouldn’t deliberately sink their own vessels.

Hegestratos saw opportunity where others saw protection. He and his coconspirator Zenothemis took out a bottomry loan for a grain shipment from Syracuse to Athens. But instead of using the money properly, they immediately sent it to Massalia (modern-day Marseille). They planned to sail for a few days, scuttle the ship, claim tragic loss at sea, and keep both the loan money and the grain.

Two or three days into the voyage, Hegestratos decided it was showtime. He snuck below deck and began cutting a hole in the ship’s hull. Meanwhile, Zenothemis stayed topside, supposedly creating a diversion.

But as Caleb hilariously reimagines it, Zenothemis was terrible at his job. Picture him “fake coughing every time there’s a loud noise from down below” while other passengers, who already didn’t like him, grew suspicious. The cutting was loud. The diversion was pathetic. Soon, passengers rushed below to find Hegestratos literally caught red-handed.

What followed was pure slapstick. Caleb envisions it as “one of those Keystone Cops chase scenes with Yakety Sax playing behind it.” Hegestratos flees through the ship, passengers in hot pursuit, ending with the fraudster hurling himself into the Mediterranean. As the ancient orator Demosthenes recorded, “Thus miserable as he was, he met a miserable end as he deserved, suffering the fate which he proposed to bring about for others.”

You’d think watching your partner drown would inspire some soul-searching. Not Zenothemis. With remarkable audacity, he tried to continue the fraud. He actually asked the crew to sink the ship anyway, arguing that “all hope was lost.”

When that failed and they limped to shore at Cephallenia, there was a dispute. Protus, the “supercargo” responsible for the grain reaching Athens, wanted to continue there. Zenothemis insisted they go to Massalia, claiming connections to the deceased fraudster and the original lenders. The local magistrates sided with Protus. They ordered the ship to Athens, where Zenothemis filed lawsuits claiming ownership of the grain.

The Mystery Ending That Still Bugs Historians

The frustrating part of this story is we don’t know how it ended. The original documents were “mutilated,” leaving only 32 paragraphs that “yielded no satisfactory sense” about the final verdict.

This uncertainty has sparked debate for centuries. John M. Zane’s 1925 Michigan Law Review analysis offers a twist: maybe Zenothemis wasn’t a coconspirator but another victim. Zane points out that Zenothemis had no access to the redirected money, no legitimate claim to sell the cargo, and nothing to gain from the ship sinking. Maybe he desired to return to Massalia because he genuinely wanted to collect insurance to repay his lender friends.

Zane even suggests that if it went to trial, the rich lenders probably lost because Athenian juries were populist and unsympathetic to wealthy plaintiffs, a dynamic that sounds familiar to anyone following modern white-collar crime prosecutions.

Whether Zenothemis was a fraudster or a fool, the case establishes a principle fundamental to financial law: fraudulent contracts are void. This ancient precedent echoes through centuries of case law and continues protecting victims today.

Ancient Schemes, Modern Lessons

As Caleb notes, there are no new frauds, just new fraudsters. The schemes evolved from bottomry loans to blockchain, from cutting holes in ships to cutting corners in compliance, but the patterns remain:

  • Exploiting trust. Bottomry loans worked because people trusted merchants wouldn’t sink their own ships, just as modern systems assume executives won’t tank their own companies
  • The coconspirator problem. Hegestratos learned fatally that complex fraud needs help, yet every additional conspirator multiplies detection risk
  • Documentation dilemmas. Even in 360 BCE, fraudsters needed false paperwork and had to manage competing claims
  • Greed override. Both cases show how easy money overrides rational risk assessment

Caleb’s observation about creating diversions particularly resonates: “You cannot have any weak links in your conspiracy. Don’t think you can just let some hack create a half-assed diversion for you.” His reimagining of Zenothemis’s pathetic distraction attempts—fake coughing to cover ship-cutting sounds—reminds us that fraud often fails not in conception but in execution.

For CPAs and fraud examiners, these aren’t just historical curiosities; they’re training exercises in pattern recognition. The executive inflating revenues for bonuses follows Julianus’s playbook. The insurance fraudster staging accidents mirrors Hegestratos’s scheme. Understanding these patterns helps professionals spot red flags before they become scandals.

The Timeless Blueprint of Financial Deception

From emperors buying their positions to merchants attempting insurance fraud, these ancient cases reveal that financial deception is as old as commerce itself. The schemes involved ships instead of spreadsheets, cargo instead of cryptocurrency, but the underlying patterns of exploiting trust, creating false documentation, and letting greed override judgment haven’t changed.

For today’s accounting professionals, these historical frauds serve as cautionary tales and educational tools. That executive oddly eager to bypass controls? They’re following Julianus’s playbook. That unusual insurance claim with convenient timing? It echoes Hegestratos’s bottomry loan scheme. The vendor insisting on redirecting payments? They’re pulling a move as old as Massalia.

What makes these ancient frauds valuable is their stripped-down simplicity. Without modern financial instruments and digital smokescreens, we see the raw mechanics of deception. The Praetorian Guard’s throne auction isn’t fundamentally different from a board being bought off; it’s just more honest about the transaction.

Listen to the full episode of Oh My Fraud to hear Caleb bring these ancient frauds to life with his signature blend of historical detail and irreverent humor. Because sometimes the best way to understand today’s financial crimes is to study the fraudsters who wrote the original playbook over two millennia ago.

From Mob Graves to Corporate Fraud: A Prosecutor’s Journey Through America’s Most Notorious Cases

Earmark Team · July 14, 2025 ·

When former federal prosecutor Sam Buell received an unexpected phone call asking if he wanted to join the Enron Task Force, he had zero background in accounting or corporate finance. “I just got the Enron case. Do you want to come work with me?” asked his former supervisor Leslie Caldwell. Just like that, Buell found himself thrust into what would become one of the most significant corporate fraud cases in American history.

In a fascinating episode of “Oh My Fraud” podcast, Caleb Newquist and Greg Kyte interview Buell about his remarkable journey from prosecuting mob bosses to untangling Enron’s complex accounting schemes. Now the Bernard M. Fishman Distinguished Professor of Law at Duke University, Buell offers rare insider perspective on how major fraud cases are built and why corporate criminals are so difficult to prosecute.

From Organized Crime to Corporate Fraud

Before tackling Enron’s financial mysteries, Buell cut his teeth on cases straight out of a crime drama. After graduating from NYU Law School, he clerked for a federal judge in Brooklyn’s Eastern District of New York during the early 1990s.

“That courthouse was the most interesting place I had ever been in my life,” Buell explains. “At that time, in the early 90s, there was more crime than anybody knew what to do with. The murder rate in New York City was around 2,000 murders a year at its peak.”

The district was a hotbed of criminal organizations – not just the Italian Mafia, but diverse groups organized around various ethnic communities. These enterprises ran everything from drug trafficking to extortion, illegal gambling, and even human smuggling operations.

“These guys aren’t doing fraud,” Buell notes. “What they’re doing is real… it’s black markets. The question is simply what’s getting detected and caught and what isn’t. It’s a pure cat and mouse game.”

After moving to Boston, Buell joined the infamous Whitey Bulger investigation. Though Bulger himself was a fugitive, his lieutenant, Kevin Weeks eventually cooperated with authorities.

“Weeks took us to some locations where we recovered a total of five bodies,” Buell recounts. “The bodies were exactly where he said they were going to be. After 20 years, vegetation changes, everything changes. But I don’t think you forget that.”

Working on these cases taught Buell to “follow the money” – a skill that would prove invaluable when he later tackled corporate crime.

The Call That Changed Everything

In late 2001, while still working on the Bulger case, Buell received the call that would redirect his career. Leslie Caldwell, his former supervisor from New York who was now heading the Enron Task Force, invited him to join the investigation of America’s most spectacular corporate collapse.

Despite having a young child and a new house, Buell’s wife encouraged him to take the opportunity. “This is the one shot to do something,” she told him.

The learning curve was steep. “I needed a high-speed education,” Buell admits. “I didn’t even know what LIBOR was. People would say ‘LIBOR plus basis points,’ and I’d be like, ‘what is LIBOR?'”

Fortunately, prosecutors worked closely with SEC experts who could explain the complex accounting issues. “You’re talking to a lot of people who are experts, including lots of the witnesses who were CPAs. You’re like, ‘explain it to me like I’m your mother.'”

Despite the technical complexity, Buell found the fundamental challenge familiar: follow the money and identify the deception. “The people you’re dealing with speak a different language, but that doesn’t mean they’re smarter than you or capable of understanding things you’re not capable of understanding.”

The Slippery Slope of Corporate Fraud

Unlike TV crime dramas where villains set out to commit fraud from day one, Buell explains that most corporate fraud cases follow a pattern of gradual escalation.

“Once you tell the first lie, once you mess with the first number, it’s like… you read about what happened in Worldcom,” he says. What eventually became a billion-dollar accounting scandal often begins with small manipulations that executives might consider minor stretches of the rules.

Buell calls this “the creep effect” – a series of increasingly problematic decisions driven by pressure to maintain appearances and stock prices.

“These companies are being lauded as great success stories. And no CEO wants to say, ‘actually, we’re not succeeding,'” Buell explains. This reluctance creates enormous pressure, especially when executive compensation is tied directly to stock performance.

At Enron, “the tail was wagging the dog,” as Buell puts it. “Everything was designed not to have the stock price be a reflection of fundamental value, but a reflection of excitement about all the things they were going to do.”

Personal financial entanglements made this pressure even more intense. Many executives had borrowed against their company stock to finance lavish lifestyles.

“Ken Lay at Enron was being told to buy things like yachts and horses and cars and real estate—not very liquid stuff,” Buell explains. “So when the stock price starts coming down, there’s margin calls coming from the personal bankers, and they can’t be satisfied with selling other assets because you’ve put all your money into illiquid things.”

This creates a powerful motivation to keep the stock price up at all costs.

The Arthur Andersen Controversy

One of the most controversial aspects of the Enron case was the prosecution of Arthur Andersen, Enron’s accounting firm, for obstruction of justice. When Andersen employees shredded Enron-related documents as the SEC investigation began, prosecutors saw a clear case of obstruction.

“To have a big five accounting firm that was already in trouble with the SEC…suddenly have the relationship partner and somebody in the in-house counsel’s office telling all the junior people in Houston to shred everything other than the official working papers…because the SEC is looking at Enron – this was shocking,” Buell explains.

The Justice Department offered Andersen a settlement, but the firm refused to admit wrongdoing, fearing this would destroy them in civil litigation. When prosecutors proceeded with an indictment, Andersen launched a massive PR campaign with “full page ads in the Wall Street Journal about how the Justice Department is trying to put 10,000 people out of work.”

Though a jury convicted Andersen, the Supreme Court later overturned the conviction on a technical point regarding jury instructions. By then, however, Andersen had already collapsed.

The case had lasting repercussions for corporate prosecutions. “It explains a lot about why the settlement market in corporate criminal prosecutions has boomed over the last 20 years,” Buell notes. Defense attorneys now routinely argue, “You don’t want to have another Arthur Andersen,” to secure deferred prosecution agreements for corporate clients.

“Boeing got a deferred prosecution agreement and hundreds of people died,” Buell points out. “General Motors got a deferred prosecution agreement. The argument was being made, ‘Hey, you can’t slam GM. You know, you want to win Michigan.'”

Proving Criminal Intent in Corporate Settings

The central challenge in prosecuting corporate fraud isn’t just finding misleading statements – it’s establishing criminal intent in environments where some level of deception is normalized.

“When we say someone has the intent to defraud, what we really mean is that they have the intent to engage in a kind of deceit that is wrongful in the context. And they know it,” explains Buell.

He illustrates this through a comparison: “Think about the difference between poker and golf. In poker, it’s part of the game that everyone is trying to deceive each other… In golf, you’re supposed to apply the rules very strictly to yourself.”

This distinction extends to financial markets, where different sectors have different norms about acceptable negotiation versus fraudulent misrepresentation.

Applying this framework to Enron reveals why the case was so complex. “It wasn’t like there was no there there,” Buell explains. Unlike a pure Ponzi scheme, Enron had legitimate business operations. “The criminal case was a collection of pieces of the business and incidents over time where they stepped over the lines and told lies. That doesn’t mean that the whole company was a fraud.”

Buell describes Enron as “a Rube Goldberg device…cantilevered off of itself constantly.” This complexity made it challenging not only to identify fraud but also to explain it to juries.

Why Corporate Fraud Persists

Despite landmark prosecutions and regulatory reforms like Sarbanes-Oxley, corporate fraud continues to plague our financial system. When asked what continues to surprise him, Buell answers simply: “That the scandals never stop.”

He points to ineffective regulation as a key factor. “Every single one of these cases almost…you can see directly the story of taking advantage of ineffective regulators.” From Boeing’s relationship with the FAA to Volkswagen’s emissions cheating, companies exploit weak oversight.

Sarbanes-Oxley, passed after Enron, had limited impact on criminal enforcement. More troublingly, it “never took up the question of what kind of products are being traded, by whom, and what is the danger of that…the shadow banking problem.”

Buell sees Enron as “a canary in the coal mine” that foreshadowed the 2008 financial crisis. “Enron, even though it was an energy company, was basically trying to run itself like an investment bank, trading products that were not regulated by the banking system in ways that ended up being much riskier than people realized.”

Most disappointing is how little we seem to learn from these cases. “Every time one of these things blows up, there’s all this talk about lessons learned. But the lessons don’t actually seem to get learned.”

For a fascinating first-hand account of how major corporate fraud cases are built from the prosecutor’s perspective, listen to the full conversation with Sam Buell on the Oh My Fraud podcast. His experiences provide essential context for understanding why corporate fraud remains so persistent despite our best efforts to prevent it. 

You can also earn free CPE for listening with Earmark.

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